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It is argued that realism and true randomness are fully compatible. Realistic true random events
are acts of pure creation that obey strict laws, but do not necessarily satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms
of probabilities. Realistic true randomness is some sort of nondeterministic force, or propensity of
physical systems to manifest such and such properties under such and such conditions. Realistic
random events reflect preexisting properties, as required by realism, simply the reflection is not
deterministic; still, the preexisting properties determine the propensities of the different possible
events.
It is argued that deterministic extensions of quantum physics are necessarily incompatible with
special relativity. Hence, from today’s violations of Bell’s inequalities one can conclude that all
future physics theories will display true randomness as does quantum physics.
It is argued that accepting true randomness and realism leads to new questions with interesting
answers, allowing one 1) to study nonlocality in configurations with many independent sources and
2) to bound how much free will is needed for a proper violation of Bell’s inequality.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of elaborating connections between fun-
damental concepts like realism, locality or free will on the
one hand, and hard sciences like physics or biology on
the other is fascinating. But it comes along with the
danger of vagueness, if not blatant vacuous phraseology
(especially when physicists express their views). Hence,
I won’t attempt to (re)define realism or free will, but
rather try to illustrate my purpose with what I consider
insightful connections to parts of physics that I am fa-
miliar with. I’ll try to follow the example of locality of
nature and Bell inequalities, an example that Abner Shi-
mony named experimental metaphysics [1].
Recently we learned that connecting a fundamental
concept like locality to quantum physics, thanks to the
work of Bell and many others, allows one to investigate
new applications. I consider this as the signature that
the connection is deep and not merely superficial: from
deep connections new questions, and also new applica-
tions ought to emerge. For example, the connection be-
tween locality of nature and Bell inequalities has gone
way beyond what Bell and other precursors had origi-
nally in mind. Today, Bell inequalities cross-fertilized
with Quantum Information Science has led to the con-
cept of Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
(DI-QKD) [2, 3]. This is a protocol for establishing a
cryptographic key between two distant partners in which
the security is not based on Hilbert-space quantum me-
chanics, as it is for standard QKD, but the security is
based directly on the violation of a Bell inequality, that
is on quantum nonlocality [4, 5]. The intuition is very
simple: if no local variable can describe the correlation,
then no adversary can possibly hold a copy of these non
existing local variables. Despite the simplicity of the in-
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tuition, it took a long time to make it precise and it is
still an active field of research with plenty of open ques-
tions. Such a connection also gives a welcome new push
towards detection loophole free experiments (especially
with photons over tens of kilometers). Suddenly the in-
famous detection loophole is part of applied physics [6, 7]!
This note is organized as follows. First, in section II,
I’ll ask what is realism for a quantum physicist. I’ll ar-
gue that there is no contradiction between realism and
non-determinism: a non-deterministic world can be as
real as a deterministic one. Actually, our world is non-
deterministic and real. Next, in section III, building on
the previous one I ask what additional variable in a non-
deterministic theory, like quantum physics, could mean.
I’ll illustrate my point by showing how different concrete
answers lead to different new results. Finally, in section
IV, I admit true randomness to illustrate the new ques-
tions and applications that follow; surprisingly these deal
with quantifying free will [8].
II. REALISM AND TRUE RANDOMNESS
Realism is often ”defined” as stating that there is some-
thing out there and that we can interact with it. This is
too vague for direct usage in physics. At least one should
be precise about what it means to interact with reality.
Must the interaction be a direct one? or could a mere
indirect interaction suffice? and what is meant by an in-
direct interaction? Furthermore, should the interaction
be 2-way?
Often (too often) physicists reduce realism to the idea
that each physical quantities always possesses a value.
But then, either this value is unaccessible, hence unphys-
ical. Or this value can be revealed by appropriate mea-
surements (to arbitrary good approximation, at least in
principle). But then, these measurements have predeter-
mined outcomes: the world is deterministic and realism
is nothing but a fancy word for determinism.
Let us consider a world in which some measurements
produce truly random results. In such a world, some
events are fundamentally not predetermined; not only
do we, humans, not know them in advance, and there is
no way for us to know them in advance, but even nature
doesn’t know them in advance. Why should such a world
not be real? We might be influenced by our cultural con-
text: God has all power, including that of knowing the
future, hence the future can’t be really open. Fine, we are
certainly influenced by our culture, but this is certainly
not an admissible argument for scientists. So, what op-
poses true randomness and realism? Maybe the fear that
true randomness implies true becoming, i.e. spontaneous
acts of creation? Yes, but why should acts of creation
(non-predetermined events that just happen) not be real?
Is it the fear of chaos? Such a fear seems inappropriate
in a period governed by quantum physics: we know that
randomness can be very well organized and structured
by strict laws. Finally, the problem might be that a ran-
dom event seems to emerge from outside the world: since
before its realization it was nowhere inside the world, it
had to come from outside.
I am afraid that we have now reached a point of suf-
ficient vagueness for all possible answers to be equally
possible/impossible. Let’s be pragmatic: a pure random
event just happens, it follows some probability laws (i.e.
has a well defined propensity to manifest itself), but it
comes from nowhere. And this doesn’t make it any less
real than deterministic events like the arrival of a train
in a station.
What determines the probability (propensity) of mea-
surement results? The answer is that measurement
results reflect preexisting properties: this is re-
alism! Simply, the reflection is not a deterministic one,
the preexisting properties only determine the propensi-
ties1, i.e. the natural tendencies, of the different mea-
surement results. Note that this is absolutely compatible
with standard quantum mechanics: the probabilities of
measurement results are defined by the reduced density
matrix. Hence, randomness is not a problem for realism.
Leggett suggested that the preexisting properties
should be pure quantum states and that these pure states
define the local probabilities in the usual quantum way
[11]. This model has been experimentally falsified [12].
Surprisingly some physicist insist that realism implies
that the preexisting properties are pure quantum states
1 The word probability is so much linked in physicists mind to
Kolmogorov axioms that one should avoid it. Indeed, proba-
bilities satisfying Kolmogorov axioms can always be interpreted
as epistemic and one is thus tempted to add hitherto ”hidden
variables”. Hence it is advantageous to use a different word like
propensity. This concept is closed to Poper’s [10] (whose poor
understanding of the EPR argument obscured his deep plea in
favor of propensities). In [9] I argued that the propensities in
quantum physics are minimal generalizations of determinism in
the sense that the Hilbert space structure is such that for all pure
states the set of elements of reality (i.e. physical quantities that
posses a deterministic value) uniquely determine the propensities
of all physical quantities.
and from the falsification of Leggett’s model conclude
that realism is falsified. But, clearly, only their limited
concept of realism (local pure states with arbitrary non-
local correlations) has been falsified!
There remains the question concerning when random
events happen. I don’t know any better answer than the
one proposed by the French philosopher Cournot [13]:
random events happen at the meeting point of two causal
chains, as - I like to add - at the meeting point of a quan-
tum causal chain (described by Schro¨dinger’s equation)
and a classical measurement apparatus. Admittedly I
don’t know how to characterize classical measurement
apparatuses. Possibly one has to go all the way and con-
sider the second causal chain in Cournot’s argument as
triggered by free will? Alternatively, one has to assume
that all evolutions are stochastic (i.e. the Schro¨dinger
equation is only an - excellent - approximation), as in
GRW-like models [14–17].
Accordingly, true randomness is compatible with real-
ism. But, some may further argue, determinism is nicer.
So why should one believe in true randomness in physics?
After all the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave model shows
that it is not necessary. This claim, however, is wrong,
as shown in [18] and emphasized in section III: quantum
physics and special relativity exclude any deterministic
extension of quantum physics (but admittedly one may
assume that relativity is incomplete [21], e.g. that there
is a universal privileged reference frame and that a de
Broglie-Bohm model describes reality in this privileged
frame, see however [22, 23].
In conclusion, although some questions remain open, I
see no reason to doubt that true randomness is compat-
ible with realism.
III. WHAT IS LOCAL IN LOCAL VARIABLES?
In this section I elaborate on the physical meaning of
λ, the historically so called local hidden variable, named
shared randomness by today’s computer scientists, and
whose reality is denied by some who hope to thus get rid
of nonlocality.
In any derivation of a Bell inequality one always en-
counters the following factorization condition, also called
separability condition:
p(a, b|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, λ) · p(b|y, λ) (1)
where a and b are the measurement results (the out-
comes) secured by the two usual players Alice and Bob
when they perform the measurements x and y (the in-
puts).
But what is λ?
The usual answer runs as follows. λ denotes a well
localized beable attached to particles [24]. According to
this picture, the local λ is produced by the same source
as that emitting the entangled particles and copies of λ
are carried by each of the particles. Hence, if the par-
ticles are widely separated in space, then the outcome
probability at Alice side can depend only on the local
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measurement setting x (Alice’s input) and the local be-
able λ, and similarly on Bob’s side. The factorization
condition (1) is thus a consequence of locality:
λ = local beable & locality (2)
⇒ factorization condition (1) (3)
⇒ Bell inequality (4)
Note that there is no need to assume that λ determines
the measurement outcomes, it suffice that λ determines
the outcome propensities. Hence, denying determinism is
clearly not sufficient to avoid Bell inequalities and their
consequences, i.e. quantum nonlocality.
The above idea is the standard one; it is also the
one John Bell had in mind when he derived his famous
inequality (recall that Bell was greatly influenced by
Bohm’s pilot-wave model in which λ denotes the parti-
cles’s position) [24]. But, let’s go further. If this picture
tells us something deep, then there ought to be conse-
quences beyond Bell inequalities. And indeed there are.
If 2 independent sources produce independent pairs of en-
tangled particles, as in entanglement swapping [25], then
there should be 2 independent sets of local variables λ1
and λ2. This is interesting and does indeed lead to new
tests of this kind of local variables. In [26] we proved
that a visibility higher than 1
2
in entanglement swapping
experiments between independent sources, as e.g. [27],
suffices to falsify such models. This is significantly eas-
ier than violating the usual CHSH-Bell inequality that
requires a visibility >
√
1/2. It is surprising and dis-
appointing that it took more than 60 years from Bell’s
breakthrough to indepth study of the consequences of
treating λ as local beable. This illustrates the damage
when realism is not considered seriously.
But there is a quite different way of looking at the λ
in the factorization condition (1). Let us first consider
standard quantum physics. In this case, λ stands for the
usual quantum state ΨAB and condition (1) is nothing
but the condition that the quantum state is separable.
Next, consider a future theory, a theory that surpasses
quantum theory. At present, we do not know this theory,
but we known that any physical theory makes predic-
tions. Hence, λ could equally well stand for the physical
state of the two systems in Alice and Bob’s hands as
described by any possible future physics theory, i.e. λ
determines p(a, b|x, y, λ). As we do not know this theory,
we do not know how to prepare a given λ state, but we
know that the preparation we carry out today in our labs
correspond to a mixture of the λ’s of this future theory.
Hence, condition (1) is an assumption about any possible
future theory. The fact that Bell inequalities are exper-
imentally violated today implies thus that any possible
future theory (in agreement with today’s experiments)
displays nonlocality.
Actually, one can go even further and interpret λ as
the state of the entire universe (as described by today’s
quantum theory or as described by any possible future
theory). In such a view λ is not localized. But one can
nevertheless study the consequences of the locality (or
separability) assumption (1). The only assumption we
need in order to make sense of (1) and of the Bell inequal-
ities is that the two inputs, x on Alice and y on Bob’s
side, are independent of λ. Hence λ denotes the state of
the entire universe, except the inputs x and y, i.e. Alice
and Bob enjoy free will even given λ (or there are random
number generators independent of λ): p(x, y|λ) = p(x, y)
for all λ.
Notice the difference. Historically λ was considered
only as a local beable, but actually one can consider λ
as the real state of the entire universe, except only the
two inputs x and y. That is, λ does not at all need to be
local: λ can be considered as a nonlocal beable, it
suffices to assume that the outcome propensities of the
local measurements are determined by the local inputs
and the global state λ.
Hence, the violation of a Bell inequality not only means
that quantum physics is nonlocal (predicts nonlocal cor-
relations), but that any future physical theory is likewise
nonlocal.
Again, such a view of λ as the physical state of the
entire universe (except x and y) as described by any fu-
ture theory ought to have consequences. Let’s thus con-
sider such nonlocal beable λ (i.e. without the assump-
tion (1)), but assuming them covariant in the sense of
special relativity. Because I do not know how to de-
scribe true probabilities in special relativity, I’ll restrict
the analysis to deterministic covariant nonlocal λ’s. If Al-
ice makes her measurement first, in some reference frame,
then her outcome a is a function of λ and of her input:
a = FAB(x, λ), and Bob’s outcome is a function of his in-
put y, of λ and possibly of Alice’s input x (because Bob
makes his measurement after Alice): b = SAB(x, y, λ).
In another reference frame in which Bob makes his mea-
surement first, the situation is symmetric: b = FBA(y, λ)
and a = SBA(x, y, λ), where the subscript BA reminds
us of the time ordering. If λ is covariant (i.e., more
precisely, the outcomes determined by λ are covariant),
then the outcomes should be independent of the reference
frame: a = FAB(x, λ) = SBA(x, y, λ). Hence the func-
tion SBA(x, y, λ) has to be independent of y. But then
the pair of functions FBA(y, λ) and SBA(x, λ) define a lo-
cal model in the sense of (1), which contradicts well con-
firmed quantum predictions. This simple argument was
seemingly first dispelled in [18]. Hence, studying nonlocal
λ’s tells us something important: they can’t be determin-
istic (see also [19, 20]). Note that as a consequence, they
neither could be probabilistic in the usual sense of prob-
ability (i.e. satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms), since usual
(Kolmogorov) probabilities can always be interpreted as
epistemic probabilities: by adding a random variable to
λ the theory becomes deterministic.
In summary, true randomness will be part of all future
physics theory.
IV. CAN FREE WILL BE QUANTIFIED?
In a deterministic world there is no free will. At best
there could be the illusion of free will. But there is noth-
ing I know deeper than the fact that I enjoy free will.
3
How could science question this conviction? In order to
do science one has to be able to test theoretical mod-
els. But one can perform experimental tests only if one
is able to freely chose which tests to perform and when
to perform them. Hence, without free will science is im-
possible. Consequently, science can’t even question the
existence of free will2. Or science would also be an illu-
sion: we could live in a world ruled by some laws, but
be determined (programmed, as in the film Matrix) to
perform those experiments that delude us to believe in
totally different laws.
Hence, any serious scientist has to believe in
free will.
Determinism is incompatible with free will, but ran-
domness is clearly not sufficient to explain free will. Free
will, by essence, seems to emerge from outside space-
time, i.e. it is not part of physics. Nevertheless, accept-
ing free will and true randomness in a realistic world-view
allows one to ask new questions and work out new appli-
cations.
First the application. If quantum measurement results
are truly random, then they provide us with truly random
numbers. Hence, Quantum Random Number Generator
(QRNG) is a natural application. QRNG is actually al-
ready a commercial success: one can buy little devices of
the size of a match box that deliver megabits of quan-
tum random numbers per second [28]. But for the pur-
pose of this note, this might be too simple: the outcomes
of the QRNG could actually have been produced much
earlier, memorized in the ”match box” and delivered on
demand. But consider the following. The outcomes of
measurements in Bell tests are random and their correla-
tion guarantees that they were not produced in advance,
at least not before the inputs were given. Hence, if the
inputs are random and the correlation violate some Bell
inequality, then the outcomes are necessarily also random
and unique. Now, the input bit string can be shorter
than the output, i.e. one consumes less input random
bits than the number of output random bits produced.
For example the input could be binary and the outcome
ternary. This offers a new application: randomness ex-
pansion [29, 30]! One can even go a step further. The
input bits could be freely chosen by humans. The in-
put bit rate would be very low, at best one freely chosen
bit per second or per minute. But using the Bell-based
randomness expansion several times in series one could
get arbitrarily high rates of truly random bits, a very
valuable resource for our information based society.
Next, the new question. Free will is needed for science.
But how much free will is required? More precisely, as-
sume we do not enjoy full free will, then how much lack of
free will is still compatible with science? Let me illustrate
these seemingly impossible questions, we’ll see that one
can quantify the maximum lack of free will compatible
with proper tests of Bell’s inequality.
2 Note that our experience of free will comes first, also with respect
to philosophy. Hence, no rational argument against free will can
be relevant.
Let me first explain what I mean by lack of free will.
Assume one has to make a choice between N possibili-
ties. Hence, one needs log2(N) bits of free will. Now,
assume that actually we are partially determined and
that in fact we can only chose between M possibilities
(M < N): although we have the illusion to chose be-
tween all N possibilities, we actually chose only between
M possibilities, i.e. we are programmed not to chose any
of the remaining N −M remaining ones. Then our lack
of free will would be log
2
(N) − log2(M) = log2(N/M).
For example, if one has to chose between 4 possibilities,
c1, c2, c3, c4, but if one is actually determined to chose
only between c2 and c4, then one lacks 1 bit of free will.
I am not claiming that this is how things work in real-
ity, but I like to illustrate that if one takes free will on
the one side and true randomness on the other side both
seriously as real, then new interesting questions can be
raised and answered.
It is well known that a proper demonstration of quan-
tum nonlocality (i.e. violation of a Bell inequality) re-
quires that the inputs are truly chosen at random, or
even better by the free will of two independent humans,
Alice and Bob. More precisely, if the inputs were prede-
termined, then no proper violation of any Bell inequality
is possible, because the bound of the inequality could
be as high as the algebraic maximum (the local variable
could be correlated to the inputs or, equivalently, could
determine which inputs are used in any run of the exper-
iment). But what if the inputs are only partially chosen
at random? For example, suppose a Bell inequality with
four possible inputs on Alice side. What if Alice is actu-
ally determined in each round of the experiment to freely
chose only between 2 of the 4 inputs (the 2 inputs may
vary from one run to the next, so that on average all 4
inputs happen with equal frequency)? Would such a 1 bit
lack of free will still allow for a violation of Bell inequal-
ity? And what if the input alphabet is arbitrarily large?
Surprisingly, in [31] we prove that all probabilities of all
standard (i.e. projective) measurements on two qubits in
any maximally entangled state can be simulated if Alice
lacks a single bit of free will, even if Bob enjoy full free
will3. Consequently, if one of the two partners lacks a
single bit of free will, then no violation of any Bell in-
equality with binary outcomes could ever be observed,
whatever the number of possible inputs.
In the case of partially entangled pairs of qubits it is
known that a lack of 2 bits of free will render any viola-
tion impossible [31], but it is unknown whether the lack
of a single bit of free will is compatible with a proper vio-
lation of a Bell inequality. For systems larger than qubits
3 Intuitively one may understand this by relating it to models
based on the detection loophole. In one such model [32] Bob
always produces an outcome, but for any value of the local vari-
able λ Alice has only 50% chances, depending on her input x, to
produce an outcome. Now, if for all λ Alice is programmed to
chose only among those inputs that correspond to an outcome,
then she always produces an outcome. This 50% reduction of
her free will corresponds to a one bit lack of free will.
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and for inequalities with more than binary outcomes the
answers are unknown.
Is the above sketched connection between free will and
Bell inequalities surprising? Maybe it isn’t. Nonlocal
correlations seems to emerge, somehow, from outside
space-time in the precise sense that no story in space-time
can account for them [22]. Since free will also emerges
somehow from outside space-time, Bell tests might pro-
vide us with glimpses on free will.
In summary, free will can be lower bounded (or the
lack of free will upper bounded). Tests of Bell inequalities
impose a lower bound on free will that is surprisingly low:
physicists must enjoy much free will in order to perform
meaningful Bell tests.
V. CONCLUSION
Realistic true randomness, or in shorter and more
elegant terms propensities, allows one to consider new
and interesting questions and applications. This is not
surprising: scientists always made progress by consider-
ing the world around them as real and independent, with
the possibility to interact with it. What is surprising
is that so many good physicists interpret the violation
of Bell’s inequality as an argument against realism.
Apparently their hope is to thus save locality, though
I have no idea what locality of a non-real world could
mean [33]? It might be interesting to remember that no
physicist before the advent of relativity interpreted the
instantaneous action at a distance of Newton’s gravity
as a sign of non-realism (although Newton’s nonlocality
is even more radical than quantum nonlocality, as it
allowed instantaneous signaling). Hence, it seems that
the issue is not nonlocality, but non-determinism. In this
note I argued that non-determinism and true random-
ness are not in contradiction with realism: propensities
reflect pre-existing properties, but the reflection is not
deterministic. There is thus no conflict between realism
and an open future: the future might not (yet) be real,
but the process by which the future becomes actual is
undoubtedly real.
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